Darren sent me these comments. Read and remember them. Bottom line, you implicitly accept the authority of an unqualified, de facto officer over you if you don't timely and properly object to the lack of qualification.
"de facto officer" doctrine is that it negates a constitutional provision.
A de facto officer is one who actually assumes and exercises the duties of a public office under color of a known and authorized appointment, but who has failed to comply with all of the requirements and conditions by law prescribed as a precedent to the performance of the duties of the office. (People v. Cradlebaugh (1914) 24 Cal.App.489, 491 [a deputy sheriff who had been appointed by the sheriff and had taken the oath of office, but who had not filed his appointment with the county clerk, was a de facto officer].) Actions of a de facto officer exercising the functions of the office lawfully and with the acquiescence of the public ... within the scope and by the apparent authority of office ... [are] valid and binding as if he were the officer legally ... qualified for the office and in full possession of it.[Citations.] (Marine Forests Society v. California Coastal Com. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 54, quoting In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill (1964) 61 Cal.2d 21, 42, original
NOTICE the court below said "AND with the ACQUIESCENCE of the public"?
Acquiescence is where a person who knows that he is entitled to impeach a transaction or enforce a right neglects to do so for such a length of time that, under the circumstances of the case, the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned his right. Scott v. Jackson, 89 Cal. 258, 26 Pac. 898; Lowncles v. Wicks, 69 Conn. 15, 36 Atl. 1072 ; Norfolk & W. R. Co. v. Perdue, 40 W. Va. 442, 21 S. B. 755 ; Pence v. Langdon, 99 U. S. 578, 25 L. Ed. 420.
Acquiescence and laches are cognate but not equivalent terms. The former is a submission to, or resting satisfied with, an existing state of things, while laches implies a neglect to do that which the party ought to do for his own benefit or protection. Hence laches may be evidence of acquiescence. Laches imports a merely passive assent, while acquiescence implies active assent. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 678; Kenyon v. National Life Ass'n, 39 App. Div. 276. 57 N. Y. Supp. GO; Johnson-Brinkman Commission Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 126 Mo. 345, 28 S. W. 870, 26 L. R. A. 840, 47 Am. St. Rep. 675. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, page 20.
It appears to me that people are FAILING to REALIZE that it is OUR FAILURE to challenge these ACTORS ACTS that ALLOW them to stand.
MAXIMS OF LAW
· To him consenting no injury is done.
· He who consents cannot receive an injury.
· Consent removes or obviates a mistake.
· Where truth is, fiction of law does not exist.
· It is immaterial whether a man gives his assent by words or by acts and deeds.
· He is not deceived who knows himself to be deceived.
· He who does not prevent what he can, seems to commit the thing.
· He who does not prevent what he can prevent, is viewed as assenting.
· He who does not forbid what he can forbid, seems to assent.
· He who does not forbid, when he might forbid, commands.
· He who does not repel a wrong when he can, induces it.
· The power which is derived cannot be greater than that from which it is derived One cannot transfer to another a right which he has not.
· The multitude of those who err is no excuse for error.
· An error not resisted is approved.
· He who is silent appears to consent.
· A presumption will stand good until the contrary is proved.
· All things are presumed to be lawfully done and duly performed until the contrary is proved.
Such as when we FAIL to DISPUTE the presumption that the ALLEGED "officer" was LAWFULLY APPOINTED, has taken & FILED their OATHS and/or BONDS as REQUIRED by law and was proceeding in a LAWFUL manner.
The simple FACT is that those ACTS of those ACTORS are UNLAWFUL and are under COLOR OF OFFICE and COLOR OF LAW.
This phrase is used to characterize an officer, a government, a past action, or a state of affairs which exists actually and must be accepted for all practical purposes, but which is illegal or illegitimate. In this sense it is the contrary of de jure, which means rightful, legitimate, just, or constitutional. Thus, an officer, king, or government de facto is one who is in actual possession of the office or supreme power, but by usurpation, or without respect to lawful title; while an officer, king, or governor de jure is one who has just claim and rightful title to the office or power, but who has never had plenary possession of the same, or is not now in actual possession. 4 Bl. Comm. 77, 78. So a wife de facto is one whose marriage is voidable by decree. as distinguished from a wife de jure, or lawful wife. 4 Kent, Comm. 36.
But the term is also frequently used independently of any distinction from de jure; thus a blockade de facto is a blockade which is actually maintained, as distinguished from a mere paper blockade. As to de facto "Corporation, " "Court," "Domicile," "Government, " and "Officer," see those titles.
In old English law. De facto means respecting or concerning the principal act of a murder, which was technically denominated factum. See Fleta, lib. 1, c. 27, § 18. —De facto contract. One which has purported to pass the property from the owner to another. Bank v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 575; Edmunds v. Transp. Co., 135 Mass. 283. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, page 324.
Of right; legitimate; lawful; by right and just title. In this sense It is the contrary of de facto, (which see.) It may also lie contrasted with de gratia, which case it means "as a matter of right," as de gratia means "by grace or favor." Again it may be contrasted with de quitate; here meaning "by law," as the latter means "by equity." See GOVERNMENT. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, page 326.
COLOR OF LAW.
The appearance or semblance, without the substance, of legal right. McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U. S. 168, 19 Sup. et.644, 43 L. Ed. 936. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION, page 217.
COLOR OF OFFICE.
An act unjustly done by the countenance of an office, being grounded upon corruption, to which the office is as a shadow and color. Plow. 64. A claim or assumption of right to do an act by virtue of an office, made by a person who is legally destitute of any such right. Feller v. Gates, 40 Or. 5-13, 67 Pac. 416, 56 L. R. A. 630, 91 Am. St. Rep. 492; State v. Fowler, 88 Md. 601, 42 Atl. 201, 42 L. R. A. 849, 71 Am. St. Rep. 452 ; Bishop v. Mc-Gillis, 80 Wis. 575, 50 N. W. 779, 27 Am. St. Rep. 63 ; Decker v. Judson, 16 N. Y. 439; Mason v. Crabtree, 71 Ala. 481 ; Morton v. Campbell, 37 Barb. (N. Y.) 181; Luther v. Banks, 111 Ga. 374, 36 S. E. 826; People v. Schuyler, 4 N. Y. 187.
The phrase implies, we think, power vested in the actor,— he must be at least officer de facto. We do not understand that an act of a mere pretender to an office, or false personator of an officer, is said to be done by color of office. And it implies an illegal claim of authority, by virtue of the office, to do the act or thing in question. Burrall v. Acker, 23 Wend: (N. Y.) 606, 35 Am. Dec. 582. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 2ND EDITION,
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